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Peking and the  
National Liberation  
Struggle

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■ The national liberation movement of the Afro-Asian peoples is undergoing a complex and important stage of its development. This stage is characterised by diversity of forms of struggle ranging from armed struggle for political independence or preservation of national sovereignty to prolonged fight for economic independence. It is also marked by desperate attempts on the part of the neocolonialists to stop the progress of the liberation struggle by outright force and subtle manoeuvres.

In these conditions unity of all progressive forces taking part in the national liberation movement and world socialism is a historical necessity. That is why Lenin's slogan: "Proletarians of all countries and enslaved peoples, unite!" remains vital today. This slogan underscores a basic principle of Soviet foreign policy. It is not surprising that the imperialists have always tried to undermine ties between the socialist countries and the peoples of the Afro-Asian continents.

Over the last few years these ties have come under attack not only from rightists but also from "leftists", that is, from the Mao Tse-tung group and its small number of followers in several countries. The newly independent nations

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have been an object of various subversive and provocative activities carried out by the Peking splitters in an attempt to sever these nations from the revolutionary forces of the world, the USSR in particular, and to place them completely under their influence. Occasionally Peking succeeded in exploiting for their own ends the social and economic conflicts, political controversies, petty-bourgeois and national prejudices that existed in some Asian and African countries and in sidetracking some national liberation movements from the general stream of world revolutionary forces. It had had certain influence on some communist parties of the East, an influence which resulted in great difficulties for these parties and in some instances shattering defeat.

What are the Peking leaders striving to achieve by their schismatic policies with regard to the national liberation movement? What are their strategic goals and real aims? What tactical methods do they employ to achieve their goals? This booklet attempts to answer these questions.

### **The Maoist Conception of the Role of the National Liberation Movement**

In deviating from Marxist-Leninist teachings the Peking leaders distorted Leninist concepts of the historical impact of the national liberation movement and its place in the world revolutionary process. Lenin was the first to prove the objective possibility as well as necessity of achieving unity of the three anti-imperialist currents of the world revolutionary process of our time: the countries of the socialist community, the na-

tional liberation movement and the revolutionary working class movement in capitalist countries. This idea of tripartite alliance of anti-imperialist forces was discussed by Lenin at the Second All-Russia Congress of Communist Organisations of the Peoples of the East held in November 1919. Lenin said:

"It is self-evident that final victory can be won only by the proletariat of all the advanced countries of the world, and we, the Russians, are beginning the work which the British, French or German proletariat will consolidate. But we see that they will not be victorious without the aid of the working people of all the oppressed colonial nations, first and foremost, of Eastern nations."

Lenin showed—and subsequent historical experience confirmed this—that the struggle of the enslaved peoples for their liberation could be successful only if it was directly linked with the revolutionary struggle of world socialism. Lenin warned against attempts to oppose these currents to one another or to overemphasise the importance of any one of them. The Maoists, on the contrary, claim that the national liberation struggle is the "major force" of our time, the "most important force dealing direct blows at imperialism", while regarding the socialist countries at best as an auxiliary force, a force of secondary importance.

Thus, for example, in the notorious article "Long Live the Victory of the People's War!" published in *Jenmin jihpao* in September 1965, the Mao theorist Lin Piao contended that "the contradiction between the revolutionary peoples of Afro-Asian and Latin American countries on the



one hand and imperialism headed by the United States on the other has become the main contradiction in the modern world". He went on: "If we regard the matter on a world-wide scale, North America and Western Europe may be called the world's city whereas Asia, Africa and Latin America may be called the world's village... The present situation may, in a sense, be characterised as the encirclement of the city. The cause of world revolution ultimately depends on the revolutionary struggle of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America which make up the overwhelming majority of the world's population..."

Here Lin Piao ignores Lenin's thesis on the importance of unity of the national liberation movement and the world socialist system and advances instead the anti-scientific proposition that it is the "village" and not the "city" which plays the key role in the revolutionary transformation of the world.

What do Mao Tse-tung and his followers try to achieve by flattering the national liberation movement and exaggerating its importance in the revolutionary process?

The answer is that the national liberation movement occupies a particularly important place in the hegemonic plans of Mao Tse-tung. Having failed in their open attempt to gain control over the international communist movement, the Peking leaders turned to a round-about way of achieving their aim. They decided to campaign for the recognition of the national liberation movement as the "most revolutionary" and the "leading" force in the world revolutionary process, in the belief that China, being the largest Asiatic

power could easily dominate the national liberation movement. Thus, through China's hegemony in the national liberation movement which supposedly plays the leading role in the world revolutionary movement, Mao hopes to establish his own world leadership. Maoist "flattery" of the national liberation movement is obviously not as disinterested or innocent as it might appear.

It may seem strange that Mao Tse-tung in his bid for world leadership would want to isolate the national liberation movement from other revolutionary forces of the world. This, however, is easily explained. The Peking leaders clearly realise that as long as the newly independent nations as well as those fighting for their independence are linked by friendly ties of cooperation with world socialism, Peking will be unable to establish its hegemony over them. The Peking leaders, therefore, concentrate their efforts on isolating the national liberation movement from socialist countries, the USSR in particular. They do their utmost to belittle the world and historical role of the countries of the socialist system and the importance of their moral, political, economic and military assistance to Afro-Asian countries, and to make these countries feel suspicious and even hostile towards the Soviet Union and other socialist countries as well as the communist parties and the working class of developed capitalist nations. Thus, in place of Lenin's thesis that with the emergence of the first Soviet state in the world and the establishment of a world socialist system no national or colonial question may be solved apart from the struggle of these socialist countries against world imperialism, the Maoists put forward the absurd propo-



sition that "to rout imperialism it is necessary to rout Soviet revisionism". They declare the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, instead of imperialism, to be the chief enemy. They have completely broken away from the international line followed by all other revolutionary anti-imperialist forces today.

The ways and methods used by Peking in its attempt to impose its big-power policy on the national liberation movement are many and varied. But in all cases the Maoists direct their main blow at the Soviet Union and the socialist community. Rejecting the idea of unity of the three anti-imperialist forces the Maoists openly advocate such racist and nationalistic notions as: "The East is the East, after all" and "The wind from the East prevails over the wind from the West". They ignore Lenin's thesis that the "international proletariat is the only ally of all the hundreds of millions of the working and exploited peoples of the East"; abandoning the class approach to the questions of revolutionary struggle they talk about the opposition of white and "coloured" nations, of the "rich" nations of the North and the "poor" nations of the South.

By juggling with such geographic and ethnic terms, the Maoists, like the apologists for imperialism, deliberately ignore the fact that not all Afro-Asian and Latin American countries are progressive—some have reactionary pro-imperialist governments, and that in Europe there exist socialist states besides capitalist countries.

Unfortunately, it cannot be said that the pseudo-theoretical inventions of the Peking splitters have had no influence on the revolutionary movement. From time to time "ideas" and "concepts"

would emerge in the movement which echo the Maoists' propositions. One is the so-called theory of four basic contradictions of the present epoch, the four contradictions being those between socialism and imperialism, between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, between the enslaved peoples and the imperialists and between the imperialists themselves. Of these "basic four" the theory lays particular stress on "two major" contradictions, namely those between socialism and imperialism and between the enslaved peoples and imperialism. And of these two the "most important contradiction" is that between the enslaved peoples and the imperialists. In short, the theory tries to prove that the national liberation struggle has the greatest impact on contemporary world developments.

If all the units of the world revolutionary movement would start emphasising their own merits and arguing about their contribution to the common struggle, they would achieve nothing except disunity and would become sidetracked from the revolutionary struggle under way. Experience also shows that whenever a unit of the world revolutionary movement loosens its ties with the world socialist system—the vanguard force—imperialism and internal reaction are able at times to score substantial victories over it. This may be seen in the temporary defeats and failures suffered by some units of the national liberation movement over the last few years.

However, despite temporary and occasional failures, the imperialists and their accomplices (voluntary or otherwise) are unable to alter the main directions of international development, while the three world revolutionary forces are



becoming more firmly united, and the possibility of scoring new victories over imperialism is greater than ever.

### Is "Mao Tse-tung's Way" the Only Way?

What do the Maoists have to offer to the peoples struggling for their independence? They demagogically reject unity and friendship with world socialism and the revolutionary-minded working people of developed capitalist countries.

They have only one suggestion: to follow "Mao Tse-tung's way". In the above-mentioned article by Lin Piao it is claimed that "Mao Tse-tung's theory has great and universal significance for present-day revolutionary battles of enslaved nations and peoples."

The very assertion that one "pattern" of social development has universal significance for all nations of the world is questionable. But let us consider the Maoist suggestion. What is meant by "Mao's way"?

"The way of the Chinese revolution discovered by comrade Mao Tse-tung," explains the editorial of the Maoist magazine *Hungchi* (No.11, 1967), "may be summed up in the words: power comes from the barrel of a gun; it is the way of relying on the peasants, of creating strongholds of revolution in the village, of surrounding the city by the village and finally, the seizure of the cities. The village, and only the village is the boundless great field of activity for the revolutionaries," we read in Lin Piao's article. "The village and only the village can serve as a base from which the

revolutionaries will begin their march to final victory."

Thus, in the opinion of the Maoists the peasantry is the most revolutionary class. To them the idea of proletarian guidance of the peasant movement is meaningless. Indeed, why should the "most revolutionary" class be guided by any other class?

When the Maoists extol the peasantry's "revolutionariness" they may give the impression of wishing to defend the interests of the toiling peasantry. The truth is the opposite. The historical experience of China, especially of the so-called people's communes and the cultural revolution, shows that the interests of the peasantry (as well as the working class) were totally ignored.

Then what is the whole clamour about? What is behind the "pro-peasant" and "anti-urban" (i.e. anti-proletarian) slogans and propositions?

The answer is that these Maoist slogans and propositions, in particular the thesis of the "encirclement of the city by the village", are designed to falsify the history of the Chinese people's revolutionary struggle. Some progressive circles in the newly independent countries, unfamiliar with the history of the Chinese liberation struggle, may indeed wonder whether it does not prove, at least in the case of China, that a backward agrarian country may embark on the road of progressive social development as a result of the "victory of the village over the city". Such questions may seem justified insofar as there are many factors which, considered superficially, would seem to support the Maoist thesis. Thus, for example, there was revolutionary struggle and



extensive guerrilla movement in the village, and agricultural "red regions" existed before the liberation of the cities took place.

But to evolve on the basis of these facts the formula: "The village encircles and defeats the city" reveals a superficial and unscientific approach. This formula distorts the real sequence and essence of historical events. What actually happened was that the revolutionary movement in China, having first been defeated in the cities, retreated to the villages and became united with the peasant democratic movement while at the same time guiding the latter, and that later with the help of the village it won the cities back from the grips of counter-revolution. It is not accidental that today Mao Tse-tung and his henchmen are finding fault with those revolutionary leaders of the CPC who retreated with their workers' and Red Guard units from the cities to the village strongholds. The Maoists are trying in this way to minimise the importance of urban communist guidance of the peasant movement.

As a matter of fact, the experience of the Chinese revolution only shows once again that guerrilla warfare, however important and significant, cannot lead to "defeat" of the cities. In China the cities were liberated by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and not by the guerrillas. The essential point here is that the PLA, as a regular army, was not a product of the village but of the city.

Naturally, a revolutionary army in a backward agrarian country inevitably bears a "peasant stamp" at the beginning, its members being mostly of peasant origin and familiar with methods of guerrilla warfare. This was true of the

Red Army when it was first formed in Soviet Russia. However, such a socio-political organisation can grow into a regular army only under the guidance of the city. For the singleness of aim, the possibility of uniting a struggling people politically, the centralisation of military leadership based on modern science, military discipline and a high level of training of soldiers and officers—all these (and many other) important and related factors in the formation and functioning of a regular army exist in the city but not in villages which are scattered, disunited, and hardly organisable.

Thus Mao Tse-tung simplified and distorted the actual state of things when he declared: "Everything in Yanan has been built up by means of the gun. Any thing can grow out of the barrel of a gun". (*Coll. Works*, Vol. 2, p. 388.) The question arises: where does the "gun" come from?

Unlike guerrilla units which are armed and equipped with every kind of weapon they can lay their hands on, a revolutionary army cannot carry out military operations without being regularly supplied with modern weapons. Naturally, for former colonial and semi-colonial countries it is difficult and sometimes impossible to organise production of all the necessary weapons and ammunition. Thus it is important for the national liberation movement to be firmly linked with the world socialist system. This is all the more urgent since in the present epoch internal counter-revolution in countries struggling for liberation invariably turns to world imperialism for aid which sometimes takes the form of direct military interference. It is a known fact that the existence of a "socialist rear" and the USSR's



friendly assistance played a decisive role in the victories scored by the PLA over the Kuomintang troops.

For obvious reasons the Peking leaders do not like to recall this fact today. If they did, they would have little chance of succeeding in making the newly independent countries believe in their "theory" of guerrilla warfare and in fostering among them a superficial and negative attitude towards the selfless aid given by the Soviet Union to the struggling nations.

This position of the Peking leaders has an especially negative effect on the heroic struggle of the Vietnamese people. Every new escalation of the US war there is characterised by the Maoists as the "death convulsions" of US imperialism. They hinder in every way possible economic and military aid to Vietnam by the fraternal countries, declaring demagogically that the Vietnamese people will be able to tackle the "paper tiger" without modern weapons and other aid of socialist countries.

However, any unbiased observer of the Vietnamese liberation struggle on the territory of South Vietnam will acknowledge that the successes of the liberation fighters are due largely to two factors: the formation and constant expansion of the regular liberation army units of the South Vietnam National Liberation Front (SVNLF) and the equipment of this army with the most modern types of armament. Even according to the Pentagon at least four-fifths of the Liberation Army's combat materiel comes from socialist countries. Today the Army's basic equipment consists not of rifles and machine guns but of modern artillery, infantry offensive weapons, anti-aircraft

means as well as tanks and armoured carriers. This makes it possible for the SVNLF command to resort to the combined tactics of regular troops operations and well-organised mass guerrilla warfare.

One can, of course, say that if the Peking leaders wish to advocate adventuristic views and ideas which completely ignore objective reality, it is their "own business". Unfortunately, however, they have close bearing on the destinies of nations in Afro-Asian countries, on the choice of tactics and strategies of the revolutionary forces in these countries. The fact is that the Mao group is dishonestly exploiting the prestige which the Chinese people enjoyed among the newly independent countries owing to their heroic struggle in the past as well as their economic successes in the first years of independence achieved with the aid of fraternal socialist countries, in particular, the Soviet Union. In misusing this prestige and falsifying the historical experience of the Chinese revolution, the Peking leaders are trying to impose a pattern of revolutionary struggle which is basically wrong on the peoples and communist parties of other countries. For this reason the Mao group must be held responsible, morally and politically, for the grave defeats and failures suffered by those revolutionary forces that trusted Peking and closely followed its policies.

### What Practice Shows

The scientific worth of any theory must be tested in the crucible of practice. The Maoists desperately needed at least one example of the universality of "Mao's way", and they began to make reckless attempts to impose their views on



some Eastern countries. As may be expected, the Maoists paid no attention to the concrete historical conditions in those countries: whether a revolutionary situation exists there, whether a vanguard force exists and will be able to head the struggle, whether the peasants are ready to rise in struggle.

What are the practical results of such attempts?

Take, for example, the historical experience of Indonesia—one of the largest countries of South East Asia, which became an object of experimentation for the Peking leaders in the first half of the sixties. The experience of the revolutionary struggle of the Indonesian Communist Party in the late forties and early fifties clearly proved the complete inapplicability of “Mao’s way” in this country. The leadership of the party repeatedly pointed out that the conditions of revolutionary struggle in China and Indonesia were different and that it would be impossible and incorrect for Indonesia to copy blindly Chinese experience. It was particularly noted that the Indonesian Communist Party did not control the army as was the case in China. It was also stressed that the creation of “strongholds” in Indonesia would be difficult and ineffective in view of the country’s geographical features; the fact that the country is made up of islands and the absence of a friendly neighbouring socialist country it could rely on (as it had been the case with China in the past) made the idea of applying the Chinese way in Indonesia even more questionable.

The party programme adopted in 1954 after overcoming leftist deviations opened the prospects of creating a national front of Communists in Indonesia, of isolating right-wing forces and

struggling successfully for the vital interests of the working people. In the 1955 parliamentary election party candidates polled over six million votes, and in the provincial elections of 1957-58 the Communist Party won first place, receiving eight million votes.

However, beginning with the sixties, under the influence of Peking, Indonesia became a place where all kinds of conferences and forums were held whose aim was to isolate the national liberation movement from all other revolutionary forces of the world. Jakarta was announced as one end of the “axis” connecting it with Peking. This was essentially a deviation from Indonesia’s traditional position of non-alignment. The logical consequences of such a policy were Indonesia’s departure from the UN and a weakening of Indonesian ties with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries as well as with some of the progressive Afro-Asian states.

It was under the influence of Peking that the leadership of the Indonesian Communist Party began to advocate the far-fetched idea that Indonesia was a “beacon” and “the most revolutionary country” in South East Asia and that “a revolutionary situation” existed there. The struggle for the vital interests of the working people was neglected and actually abandoned since Peking regarded such struggle (and still does) as a manifestation of “economism”. The growing concern of the working class over the deepening economic crisis in the country was met with nothing more concrete than the dubious slogan of the allegedly constant “movement of Indonesia’s policies to the left”.

In the end Peking’s adventurist policy led to



the consolidation of the right-wing forces and the intensification of a political crisis in Indonesia culminating in the tragic events of September 30, 1965. The Nigerian paper *West African Pilot* commented: "The events in Indonesia and in China itself showed... that in its desire to achieve its main goal and become an Afro-Asian 'Mecca' Peking is capable of sacrificing not only the national anti-imperialist forces of developing countries but also hundreds of thousands of lives of socialists."

Subsequent events showed that the Peking leaders had learned nothing from the tragic defeat of the Communist Party of Indonesia (CPI). For example, in the editorial of the magazine *Hungchi* (No. 2, 1967) the Maoists unblushingly glossed over the obvious facts and tried to prove that the shattering defeat of the adventuristic policy in Indonesia was not due to mistakes made by Peking but to the failure of the CPI leadership to follow Mao Tse-tung's instructions unconditionally and consistently. Thus the Peking leaders refuse to take the responsibility of having sacrificed the CPI for the sake of their own selfish interests and hegemonic aspirations.

The most amazing thing, however, is that the writer of the above-mentioned *Hungchi* editorial could find nothing better to recommend than that the Indonesian Communist Party should after this total defeat, continue to educate the surviving members of the communist underground in the spirit of "Mao's ideas" and accomplish the transition "from the city to the village, from a peaceful struggle to an armed struggle, from legal struggle to illegal struggle, from open struggle to secret struggle".

Once again the Peking leaders did not take the trouble of trying to analyse the concrete situation in Indonesia and the real balance of forces in the country. Instead, they offer abstract schemes and high-sounding slogans claiming, for example, that the ruling grouping in Indonesia and US imperialism that supports it are "paper tigers which look terrible but are essentially weak and harmless", and that the repressions carried out by the ruling circles "will in time only lead to an upsurge of the Indonesian revolution and bring nearer the death of the clique itself". The party that has been bled white is urged immediately to start tackling "first priority problems of the revolution", i.e. to fight "revisionism" and overthrow the existing regime.

In August 1967 Peking radio recommended Mao Tse-tung's idea of a "people's war" as the only solution for the situation in Indonesia. In September of the same year the underground radio station "The voice of the Thai People" reported the beginning of "an armed struggle of the Indonesian people" guided by Mao Tse-tung's thought and expressed the hope that "a spark would turn into flames".

The results were soon evident. Exactly one year later a punitive expedition of Indonesian government troops routed the poorly armed, half-starved rebel units headed by the surviving leaders of the communist party. Thus Peking's adventurism led the party to its second and final defeat.

### "Accident" or Logical Consequence?

The Indonesian tragedy of September 30, 1965, and subsequent developments in the country



prove that Peking's adventurist policies aimed at artificially speeding up social revolutions in Afro-Asian countries when a revolutionary situation is not ripe there are utterly wrong. But perhaps we can regard the Indonesian events as an isolated instance of the negative effects of Peking's policies? Perhaps the Indonesian tragedy was merely an accident, an unfortunate occurrence, the result of tactical mistakes?

That this is not the case is indicated by a number of political events, similar in nature to those in Indonesia, though on a smaller scale, that have taken place in the last few years. These events show that the tragedy in Indonesia is a logical consequence of Peking's adventurist and hegemonic strategy.

This strategy is rather straightforward. Peking classifies nations as "friends" or "foes" on the basis of whether or not they recognise the "brilliance" of Mao's ideas. Thus to the Maoists, the fact that there exist fundamental differences in the social and political regimes in newly independent countries is wholly immaterial. Insistence on the "universal" character of "Mao's way" makes the Peking leaders deny even the progressive nature of the non-capitalist way of development, a way followed by several Afro-Asian countries. In July 1963, during talks in Moscow with a CPSU delegation, the CPC representatives declared that the thesis of non-capitalist development was "empty talk". Naturally they are not pleased with the achievements of nations following the non-capitalist way; indeed, they brand the way as "reactionary".

The Maoists realise well enough that successful revolutionary development, the implementa-

tion of socio-economic and political transformations in these countries require mutual understanding and cooperation between their revolutionary proletariat and revolutionary democracy. Such understanding and cooperation are precisely what the Maoists are out to prevent.

The Maoists virtually admitted this in an editorial entitled "Bankruptcy of the Chinese Parliamentary Idiocy" and published in mid-August, 1967, in the newspapers *Wen Hui Pao*, *Tsefan jihpao* and the magazine *Chihpu Shenghuo*. In it the Maoists criticise Liu Shao-chi particularly for his having urged the Burmese Communist Party to stop the civil war after General Ne Win's Revolutionary Council came to power in 1962. Liu had said to the Burmese Communists: "You can do without weapons. You can bury them or let your units join the national liberation forces. . . You can cooperate with Ne Win. For what purpose? For the purpose of accomplishing a socialist revolution."

The Maoists regarded Lin's position as "a great betrayal". It is owing to the opposition of the Mao Tse-tung group that the talks begun by Ne Win's government in 1963 on ending the civil war had proved futile. Strongly influenced by Maoism and blindly following "Mao's way" the leaders of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) relied exclusively on armed struggle; they created enormous difficulties for non-capitalist development in their country and caused the party to become isolated from the masses.

In August 1967 the Peking leaders sent a telegram to the CC CPB expressing full support for the tactics of armed struggle. At the same time Peking transmitted regular broadcasts calling for



rebellion and armed struggle against the government which was characterised as "reactionary". A year later, in the autumn of 1968, the Burmese communist rebels suffered a crushing defeat. The situation was further complicated by plans of the leadership of the Burmese Communist Party to carry out an internal party purge in the spirit of the "cultural revolution" in China. This led to a split in the party and the assassination of Thakin Than Tun, the party's Secretary General, by one of his former associates.

But despite the desperate situation in the Burmese Communist Party due to Peking's interference, the Mao Tse-tung clique continued to call for fighting against "revisionism" and the use of the tactics of armed struggle. In their press releases the Maoists exaggerated the scale of military operations carried out by the Burmese Communist Party in order to create the impression that the Maoist tactics were successful.

Thus on March 30, 1969, the Hsinhua News Agency circulated a report which said that the "people's armed forces guided by the Communist Party of Burma turned their sorrow into strength and inflicted even heavier losses on the enemy." The report referred to Burmese government troops as "the enemy", by "sorrow" was probably meant the assassination of Thakin Than Tun. The report claimed that the rebel forces were winning one victory after another, that guerrilla warfare had swept the country and that the new leaders of the Communist Party in Burma would closely follow Mao Tse-tung's policy of armed struggle so that they could "win the war and seize power".

This report should make every honest patriot

and revolutionary think and answer for himself the question whether here is a case of the Maoists clinging to their old mistakes and errors out of pure stubbornness or a case of consciously pursuing a provocative policy.

We may recall that whenever the Maoists succeeded in imposing on the communist party of any country their adventuristic policy of coups and armed struggle without having made a realistic assessment of the situation in that country, the nature of its administration, the relationship between various political forces, there invariably took place either crushing defeat or complete isolation of the left-wing forces. And each time this happened the Maoists would ignore the experience of bitter defeats suffered by the communist parties whom they had influenced and continue to impose their tactics on them. This was the case with Indonesia, as it is the case now with Burma.

Thus we see Mao Tse-tung and his followers feel no sense of responsibility for the failures and flops their adventuristic policy has led to. Cynicism, arrogance and indifference to the destinies of nations and parties hallmark the activities of the Maoists. A good example of this is the standard and demagogic Maoist statement that all failures and defeats sustained by the communist parties influenced by Peking result from their not having implemented Mao's instructions consistently enough.

One cannot avoid having the impression that the Peking leaders are unconcerned about the fact that those communist parties which blindly follow their instructions are in a state of complete isolation and hopelessness, that the Maoists are



interested not in the advancement of communist parties and peoples but only in their obedience to Peking, and that the Maoists have no scruples about the methods used to exact this obedience. It may be recalled that during a talk in March 1966 with Miyamoto, who headed a delegation of the Japanese Communist Party, Mao Tse-tung, after turning down a suggestion that Communists take joint action in defence of Vietnam, said that communist parties "must not be afraid of isolation". Evidently the Maoists think that it is easier to keep within their sphere of influence sect-like parties divorced from reality and the masses.

The question arises: who is the real traitor of the socialist cause and of the liberation struggle of enslaved peoples? Does Peking really believe that the only way to keep some communist parties within their orbit of influence is to install new leadership in these parties through inhuman and provocative acts whenever it finds the existing leadership undesirable?

### **"Superb Revolutionary Situation" or Export of Revolution?**

It should be noted that Peking's strategic and tactical positions with respect to the national liberation movement were ambiguous and inconsistent even before the "cultural revolution" was launched. On the one hand Peking tries to conduct a policy of friendship and cooperation with Afro-Asian countries. In 1954 China together with India proclaimed the "Pancha-Shila" principles, i.e. the principles of peaceful coexistence. The

CPC was sponsor of the famous 1955 Bandung conference at which ten principles were adopted on anti-imperialist solidarity of newly independent nations and mutual respect of sovereignty.

At the same time the "leftist" adventuristic tendency in the CPC leadership, represented above all by the Mao group, found expression in the thesis repeatedly put forward that all national liberation revolutions in Afro-Asian and Latin American countries were popular and democratic in nature. To carry out this thesis would mean the overthrow of the existing governments in the newly independent countries.

And so the result was that while struggling against the general line of the international communist movement, exaggerating the importance of the national liberation revolutions, and demagogically hailing the "revolutionary" spirit of the national movements and even of "progressive princes and kings" (apparently hoping that in this way they would be granted recognition of their hegemony) the Peking leaders at the same time urged the overthrow of these very national governments and leaders.

This contradiction was revealed during the visit of Chou En-lai, the CPR head of government, to some African states in late 1963 and early 1964. Chou attempted to repair the shaken prestige of the CPC and assure the governments of the African states of China's friendship and support. At that same time he repeatedly expressed the idea that "there is a superb revolutionary situation on the African continent".

It is noteworthy that a certain A. M. Hyre, who had lived in Peking until 1965 as a self-appointed "representative" of the revolutionary



movement in Africa, returned to Africa and began publishing a magazine called *Revolution in Africa* in some African countries in 1965. Referring to the above-mentioned statement by Chou En-lai, Hyre demanded that "a call for socialist revolution" be issued in Africa and that "bourgeois puppets posing as national leaders" be ousted.

In the meantime Peking's press and radio continued to repeat that "a superb revolutionary situation" existed in all Afro-Asian and Latin American countries; they also ceaselessly spread the untruth that Mao Tse-tung's slogan—"power grows out of the barrel of a gun"—was being greeted by the enslaved peoples and nations with enthusiasm and said that the "flame of armed struggle is becoming brighter in Burma, India, South East Asia, Africa and Latin America".

However, a revolutionary situation does not arise merely because some people desire it, or on the order of "brilliant" personalities. One may repeat the words "revolutionary situation" thousands of times that will not make reality more revolutionary than it actually is. The Peking leaders obviously realised this and decided that since they could not afford to wait for "favours" from objective reality they should attempt to "create" revolutionary situations in various parts of the globe. This led to such pronouncements as "a state of tension is a good situation" and "the worse it gets—the better".

The danger of substituting the scientific theory of the revolutionary situation by the thesis "the worse it gets—the better" consists in the fact that advocates of the latter take only one aspect of the scientific theory—the state of crisis in socie-

ty—and completely ignore two decisive conditions: first, the readiness of the masses for a revolutionary uprising and, second, the ability of an organised revolutionary vanguard to guide the masses. And then one must also realise the great difference between a state of crisis resulting from internal social contradictions and one that is artificially created from outside. In the latter case the result may be (and frequently is) contrary to what is expected. For the masses, when their patriotic feelings are aroused, may easily turn against the outward cause of the crisis as well as against internal progressive forces. That was exactly what happened in Indonesia following the events of September 30, 1965.

In trying to create a crisis in countries where the two above-mentioned conditions of a revolutionary situation are absent, the Peking leaders are clearing the way for an offensive by rightist and reactionary forces, and breed disunity among progressive fighters in the country. This was what happened in India as a result of Peking's policy of creating a "seat of tension" there.

Violating the "Pancha-Shila" principles, Peking decided in the late fifties to "accelerate" the revolutionary process in India by organising border incidents, launching noisy propaganda campaigns accompanied by open threats of an armed intervention, etc. Shamelessly interfering in India's internal affairs, the Peking leaders called Nehru, the prominent statesman and fighter for national liberation, a "reactionary". They rejoiced whenever Nehru's government received a vote of non-confidence or whenever the Indian National Congress suffered a defeat ignoring the fact that it was the reactionary forces that capitalised on the situa-



tion and that the overthrow of Nehru's government was engineered by the extreme right-wing forces and monopoly circles.

The large-scale Sino-Indian military conflict in the Himalayas in the fall of 1962 not only resulted in the loss of thousands of lives on both sides; it also led to increased activities by right-wing parties and organisations in India which succeeded in forcing Defence Minister Krishna Menon, a staunch supporter of anti-imperialist policies, hand in his resignation and tried to involve India in a system of imperialist military blocs. In Peking's opinion, the border incidents were expected to speed up the maturing of a "revolutionary situation" in India. In August 1967 the Maoists called for the creation of "red regions of rural revolutionary struggle" in India; this was soon followed by military clashes on the Tibet-Sikkim frontier.

Such actions by Peking greatly damaged the communist movement in India. Failing to gain control over the movement, the Peking leaders in 1964 turned to a policy of splitting it up and created a "parallel communist party". But even this party did not seem "radical" or loyal enough to Peking which engineered another split and set up a so-called Marxist-Leninist Communist Party whose adherence to Mao's ideas has been publicly proclaimed.

Naturally, Peking has few real supporters but they do not enjoy the backing of the masses of their countries. But what is dangerous and pernicious about the activities of these small leftist and extremist groups is that their pseudo-revolutionary talk is used by the right-wing forces as

a convenient pretext for fighting against left-wing and progressive forces in general. Take, for example, the attempt in November 1967 to form a united-front government including the Communists in West Bengal (India). A major reason for the failure was the position of the extreme left forces which inspired a peasant revolt in one region and urged the population in West Bengal to create "free peasant zones". The revolt was on a small scale, and its influence upon the peasants was negligible, but it was immediately used by right-wing forces to discredit the united-front government. Such are the sad results of Peking's instigations through *Jenmin jihpao* (June 2, 1967) which urged the people of India "to take to arms" and "overthrow the present government".

At the 1969 International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow, S. A. Dange, Chairman of the National Council of the Indian Communist Party, said: "The damage done to the Indian revolutionary movement by the divisive line of Mao Tse-tung's leadership was too great to be passed by in silence. We continue to feel the effects of this damage even now."

In their anti-Indian activities the Peking leaders do not even hesitate to use such controversies as the territorial problems which India and Pakistan inherited from colonialism to create another seat of tension and military conflict. The peaceful efforts of the Soviet Union, which sponsored the Tashkent conference in January 1966, to settle the conflict that flared up in the summer of 1965 were violently denounced by the Maoists. This is a good example showing that Peking has no genuine concern for the well-being of the newly independent countries and is only inte-



rested in pursuing its own adventurist and hegemonic aims.

The representative of the Communist Party of East Pakistan said at the 1969 Moscow Conference: "At a time when our party as well as all progressive people in Pakistan regards it as a great patriotic task to establish friendly relations with India as this corresponds to the vital interests of our people and is extremely important for defending the national minorities in both countries against massive attacks, Maoist China is inspiring hostility between our countries and even pushing them towards war."

This clearly shows Peking's treachery and indicates that the Maoists will in the future try to use every opportunity, every split among democratic and revolutionary forces to further their own ends. All this requires constant efforts on our part to overcome Mao Tse-tung's vicious policies, to uproot national prejudices which still exist in the national liberation movement and which create favourable conditions for Maoist activities.

Despite their ostentatious "revolutionariness" Maoist slogans only serve to disarm the revolutionary forces of the newly independent countries. Since they have nothing to do with concrete reality the slogans either lead to actual inactivity on the part of the revolutionaries who satisfy themselves merely by declaring their revolutionary-mindedness or to various adventurist moves and hopeless putsches. By suggesting that revolution is near and that it is simple to carry out the Maoists divert the attention and efforts of progressive forces from the genuine revolutionary work, though routine and less "heroic", of gaining the trust of the masses and organising them. And fi-

nally the Maoist position only leads to losses in lives and material and instead of promoting social progress in any country impedes it. This position gives internal reaction the opportunity to consolidate and start broad anti-communist campaign. It in fact aids reactionary forces in their demagogic attempts to picture the Communists and other progressive groups as being anti-national and sometimes it leads to reactionary coups.

### Anti-imperialism, Maoist Style

It is not difficult to see that Peking's policy of creating hotbeds of tension resembles and even coincides with the notorious Dulles doctrine of "brinkmanship" and with US policies of unleashing a series of local wars. It is therefore not surprising that the sharp escalation of US imperialist aggression over the last few years against countries in the national liberation movement zone almost coincided with Peking's splitting and subversive activities.

Naturally, the Maoists conceal their adventurist policies by pretending to work for the interests of "world revolution", for the "speediest" elimination of imperialism which, according to Peking, would sooner or later hurl mankind into the abyss of another world war. But it is precisely such policy that is welcomed by the military circles of imperialist countries, the USA in particular. They, in their turn, refer to the "menace" of the "communist world" as the reason for further building up their countries' military strength.



And why indeed should the nations and the working people of the world pay attention to the dubious "theoretical" speculations and the "revolutionary" goals of Peking if the practical results of its policies only benefit imperialism by helping it to maintain an atmosphere of tension and "to pave the way" towards a third world war?

That this is so, that an objective merging (irrespective of their different subjective goals) of Peking and imperialist strategies is indeed taking place, may be best seen in the heroic struggle of the Vietnamese people against US aggression.

Mao Tse-tung and his supporters have done their utmost to prolong this war, to frustrate any political solution of the conflict in the interests of the Vietnamese people. Contrary to reason they have characterised escalations of the US war in Vietnam as "death convulsions" of US imperialism and regarded all attempts to unite the efforts of socialist countries as "collusion with US imperialism". Thus the Peking leaders believe that their major "proletarian international obligation" regarding Vietnam consists in fighting "Soviet revisionism".

The Maoist policy with regard to Vietnam is one of "indirect conflict and minimum risk". The essence of this policy lies in a refusal to render the Vietnamese people active and extensive support in order to avoid the risk of inviting direct US attack against China. To conceal this hardly attractive position the Peking leaders propound the thesis of "relying on one's own strength" and talk about the heroic Vietnamese people being able to tackle the "paper tiger", i.e., US imperialism, by themselves. The Maoists are not at all

concerned about the human and material losses the Vietnamese people have to bear.

On the other hand, Peking invariably claims the role of the main arbitrator in the Vietnam conflict. What the Maoists are trying to do is to use the Vietnam problem in their high-staked big-power-politics game so that the outcome of the conflict would serve their own interests.

The experience of the heroic struggle of the Vietnamese people shows that when the revolutionary forces of the world act in unity, imperialism retreats. Thus imperialism was forced to conclude the 1954 Geneva agreements despite desperate resistance of the USA. But as soon as this unity weakened the US military started escalation of the war in Vietnam. It is not surprising that all progressive public figures in Afro-Asian countries regard Peking's position as a betrayal of the interests of the Vietnamese people. And not only of the Vietnamese people. The counter-attack imperialism is trying to launch today against the liberation struggle of the peoples of Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Middle East, South Africa and other regions is directly connected with the treacherous position of the Mao Tse-tung group.

Peking is trying to worsen the internal situation in all the newly independent countries and to incite leftist forces against one another. It encourages extremist nationalistic forces especially in the Arab countries. The Mao group, for example, is trying to increase its influence over Palestine organisations that have come out against a political settlement of the Middle East conflict, and it is backing extremist adventurous elements in the Arab East. The resolution of the Confe-



rence of Communist Parties of Arab states held in May 1967 points out in particular that the Mao group and its hirelings are conducting a subversive policy in the Arab world which coincides in many respects with imperialist plans. It should be noted that the Peking leaders have done their utmost to aggravate the situation in this part of the world. They have urged the Arabs to ignore the cease-fire resolution of the Security Council, to "keep to arms" and continue the armed struggle "till complete victory is gained" (*Jenmin jih-pao*, June 7, 1967). These pseudo-revolutionary appeals, if followed by the Arab leaders, could seriously threaten the truly revolutionary gains of the Arab peoples, especially in the UAR and Syria.

While presenting themselves as the only friends of the Arab nations and promising solidarity and support, the Maoists do not really intend to render the Arab peoples any practical aid. In this case too they act according to their favourite saying: "Sit on a mountain and watch the tigers fight." At the same time the Peking leaders have tried to use the Middle East crisis to spread distrust among the Arab people towards the Soviet Union. Ignoring facts they raised hue and cry about the Soviet Union's alleged "betrayal" of the Arab states and its "collusion" with US imperialists. The Peking leaders spared no expenses to get its anti-Soviet lies published in some Arab newspapers. It seems that the Chinese splitters are competing with the imperialists in anti-Soviet propaganda.

The Peking splitters had apparently hoped to use the difficulties arising from the temporary defeat of the first days of the war to promote

their own ends. But the attempts of the Mao group to misguide the Arab people failed, for they saw that Peking's position on the Middle East crisis, as on the question of stopping the war in Vietnam, was largely determined by a desire to drive a wedge between the socialist and Arab states and to slander the Soviet Union.

The Libanese paper *An-Nidal* pointed out on June 10, 1967 that the Chinese leaders were pouring out their hatred of Libanese friends under the pretext of "solidarity" with the Arabs. On June 12, 1967, the Egyptian paper *Al-Ahram* stressed the steady and all-round assistance that the Soviet people had given to the Arabs. The paper denounced all attempts to isolate the Arab states from their true friends. The paper's editorial on June 30, 1967 said that the USSR "has proved to be a genuine friend and has done everything possible to help us".

It seems at first glance that the numerous "accusations" by the Peking leaders against the Soviet Union are devoid of elementary logic and consistency. When the Soviet Union renders all round moral and material (including military) aid to peoples waging an armed struggle against imperialism (as in the case of Indonesia's struggle for the liberation of West Irian, the Vietnamese people's struggle against US aggression and the Arab nations' endeavour to defeat imperialist intrigues), the Maoist leaders call this aid "imaginary" and begin to defend their thesis of "relying on one's own strength" claiming that these peoples are not in need of support from the USSR or other socialist countries. And whenever, owing to the aid and support of socialist countries, the peoples were able to force the imperialists to agree to a compromise,



the Chinese leaders clamoured that the Soviet Union had "betrayed" these peoples and entered some kind of collusion with the USA, etc.

This illogical behaviour of the Peking leaders, however, has its own hidden logic. This logic lies in anti-Sovietism, in a narrow-minded, nationalistic desire to slander any step which the Soviet Union takes. If we try to understand Peking's policy with regard to the national liberation movement from the point of view of helping the liberation struggle, we will not find any logic in the actions of the Peking leaders. But if we bear in mind the big-power chauvinistic and anti-Soviet character of Peking's policy, we will no longer find it a riddle.

The Maoists' method is to "discredit" the USSR in the eyes of Afro-Asian and Latin American peoples. It is carried out in the following way: first they set the ultra-revolutionary and obviously unrealistic demand that the Soviet Union should "for the sake of Vietnam, Cuba or the Arab people" unleash a war against the United States (which would practically amount to a thermonuclear world war), and then they "accuse" the USSR of being unwilling to help the struggling revolutionary nations. Here Peking is not at all interested in whether Vietnam or Cuba really receive Soviet aid (since these and many other countries would be destroyed in the event of a thermonuclear war). What Peking is primarily concerned with is the realisation of Mao Tse-tung's "idea" of making the two great powers clash in a nuclear conflict in the hope that such a conflict will clear the way for China's becoming the supreme world power.

## "Cultural Revolution" for Export

The bankruptcy of Mao's chauvinistic plans to dominate the national liberation movement became obvious by the end of 1965. It may be seen in the meagre results achieved by Chou En-lai on his tour of African countries in 1964; in the failure of the Maoists to drive a wedge between the white and "coloured" peoples and to create a new "revolutionary" organisation on this basis as a counterforce against the UN; in the frustration of the Maoist adventurist plans in Indonesia; and in the unsuccessful attempt of the Maoists to dominate or split up the movement for Afro-Asian solidarity. These and other failures of the Maoist foreign policy have opened the eyes of young sovereign states to the viciousness of the policies of Mao Tse-tung and his followers. It is obvious that the overwhelming majority of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America do not intend to follow Mao's adventurist line aimed at isolating them from the countries of the socialist community.

The notorious "great proletarian cultural revolution" in China was, in its foreign-policy aspect, a reaction of the Maoists to the defeat and growing isolation of China in the international arena. It put an end to Peking's two-faced policy towards the national liberation movement. Ostentatious display of friendship towards the leaders of the newly independent nations was dropped. Having failed to win acknowledgement of their supremacy, the Maoists simply proclaimed Mao Tse-tung "the leader of the nations of the world" and China "the centre of the world revolution". They openly declared their intention



to "hoist the banner of Mao Tse-tung's ideas over the whole world".

On September 1, 1966 *Jenmin jihpao* on behalf of the "militant school of the hungweipings" published an article called "Destroy the Old World and Build Up a New One". The article says: "We hungweipings are out to make a general revolt not only in this country; we are also ready to enter the international arena and struggle to the end. We shall launch a general rebellion together with the enslaved nations and peoples of the whole world."

The events which soon followed show that Peking seriously intended to export Maoism and apply the hungweiping methods in the international arena. Ignoring the sovereignty of the Afro-Asian states and violating generally accepted standards of behaviour the Peking leaders used China's inter-state and foreign economic relations to achieve their ends. They turned China's diplomatic, trade and technical missions and Chinese minorities living in Afro-Asian states into propaganda media for "Mao's ideas".

Crude attempts to influence public figures in the newly independent countries, bribery of reactionary dissident groups, and circulation of inflammatory and plainly anti-government leaflets, "red books" containing Mao's writings, badges and buttons with Mao's picture—all this has become routine practice of Maoists abroad.

For example, in the middle of 1967 it was reported in the world press that Peking's representatives were carrying on subversive activities against the government of Kenya and attempting to influence that country's foreign policies. A document had been discovered in Nairobi signed

by "Kenyan friends of China" in which all the leading members of the government are called "imperialist puppets". That the Maoists had a hand in the document soon became known. In late June the Kenyan government declared China's chargé d'affaires in Kenya "persona non grata" and demanded that he leave the country. The Kenyan government noted at the same time that it was studying the question of severing diplomatic relations with the CPR in connection with criticism by the Chinese embassy personnel of the state bodies in Kenya. Prior to this three other African states broke diplomatic relations with Peking.

The pernicious and adventurist activities of the Maoists are spreading to all continents. For example, in late June 1967 Peking incited Chinese students in Burma to organise anti-government demonstrations. During the demonstrations Mao's sayings and anti-government slogans were shouted and pro-Chinese leaflets were circulated. Young hooligans tore the state flag and the portrait of Burma's national hero, Aung San. They beat a Burmese teacher and seriously injured two Burmese reporters. At meetings held in Peking high CPR officials attacked the Burmese government and threatened to overthrow it, and delivered anti-Soviet speeches.

As it became known later, the Peking leaders had instructed the Chinese residents in Burma to create hungweiping organisations and "raise high the banner of the proletarian cultural revolution". After the sponsors of these outrages were ordered to leave Burma, the Chinese government sent one note after another to the Burmese government containing all kinds of warnings and



threats and at the same time staged hungweiping demonstrations near the Burmese embassy in Peking.

The motives behind Peking's anti-Burmese activities may be gathered from articles published in the Burmese newspaper *Botatoung* on July 19 and 23. The articles point out that the Peking leaders, following their chauvinistic policies, protested against the conclusion of an agreement settling the border line between Burma and India. They insisted that in such cases Burma ought to have first obtained Peking's sanctions. "The present Sino-Burmese conflict," said the articles, "is a result of Peking's persistent attempt to export Mao Tse-tung's 'world revolution' to Burma. It is a consequence of the Mao Tse-tung personality cult, the desire to raise him to the status of a leader of world revolution and of the so-called great proletarian cultural revolution in the Peking style. It is a result of Peking's chauvinistic policy towards Burma."

Peking's provocations against peace-loving Burma which traditionally had friendly relations with the Chinese people surprised foreign observers, who were at a loss for an explanation of Peking behaviour. Some believed at the time that the provocations were an isolated episode in Peking's foreign policy pursuits. However, many events which took place later show that under the pretext of revolutionising the situation Peking crudely interfered in the domestic affairs of many other states. And thus the Burmese episode was not an accident but a logical consequence of Peking's provocations exactly as in the case of India, Nepal, Singapore, Ceylon, Cambodia and other developing countries.

Resistance on the part of many countries against Maoist attempts to interfere in their domestic affairs greatly irritated Peking. When, for example, Ceylon authorities confiscated a smuggled consignment of badges with Mao Tse-tung's picture on them, the Foreign Office of the CPR reacted, as usual, with a protest note to the Ceylon government full of warnings, outright threats and insults.

In 1967, after the Cambodian government dissolved all Cambodian friendship societies with other states, including the Society of Khmer-Chinese Friendship, Peking continued to maintain direct contact with the dissolved organisation, thus defying the Cambodian government. At a press conference on September 11, the head of the state Norodom Sihanouk described Peking's actions as "outrageous interference in the affairs of a sovereign state". He said that "the CPR questions the right of the sovereign state of Cambodia to be master in its own country".

A few days later in another statement Norodom Sihanouk called attention to the contemptible activities of the Hsinhua News Agency which regularly reported to Peking details concerning the "success" of "Maoisation" among Cambodia's citizens. Sihanouk stressed that the Khmer people "were not enthusiastic about the Maoist ideology." "As for the Soviet Union," continued Sihanouk, "I must say that it has never done anything to harm our friendship with China. Thus China cannot accuse it of opposing this friendship."

Matters worsened to an extent that in autumn 1967 Cambodia was forced to order a number of Chinese diplomatic representatives out of the



country. The Cambodian government also forbade publication of Peking-financed newspapers advocating Maoist hegemonic views in the country. In this instance the Chinese government was finally compelled to send a note of apology to Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

Nor was neighbouring Nepal neglected by the hungweipings. At first they confined themselves to circulating Mao's badges. But in July 1967 the CPR embassy staff in Katmandu and Chinese specialists working in Nepal organised two demonstrations at the airport from which Chinese diplomats ousted by Delhi were to fly home. In reply to protest by the Nepalese government the CPR's embassy delivered a note full of insults. And on October 2, 1968 when Queen Ratna appeared at a reception at the Chinese embassy the orchestra, contrary to diplomatic protocol, played the CPR's national anthem instead of the national anthem of Nepal.

Such actions evoke great indignation not only on the part of the government but also of the public in Nepal. They have led to frequent anti-Chinese demonstrations in the country's capital and other cities. The Nepalese newspaper *Commoner* commented in summer 1967: "No one here wants China to export its 'cultural revolution' to Nepal. Our small country does not want to be unfriendly towards anybody, least of all its neighbours. However, it expects to be left alone and hopes no one will attempt to implant any 'cultural revolution' here."

One can easily mention more Maoist activities of this kind, but it is hardly necessary. Such activities have resulted in the growing isolation of Peking, and even those countries which attempt

ted to maintain normal friendly relations with China had to give up the effort in the end.

### **Peking—an Enemy of Solidarity with Newly Independent Nations**

The Peking leaders have failed to dominate the national liberation movement. This, however, does not mean that Peking's splitting activities have not done harm to the cause of international solidarity of anti-imperialist forces or that the dangerous influence of Peking's subversive activities has been overcome.

Since 1962 the Peking leaders have used various methods to gain control over the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation. As usual, first they bluntly claimed leadership in this organisation and tried to make it follow their policy. When they had failed to achieve this, the Peking leaders began to disrupt the work of the organisation in every possible way. They tried to turn it into an ineffective discussion club, a rostrum for anti-Soviet propaganda. They also tried to prevent this organisation's executive bodies from functioning normally. All these attempts failed, but nevertheless they sidetracked much time and effort from the anti-imperialist struggle.

Given below is only a brief summary of Peking's splitting activities within the framework of this organisation.

At the third Afro-Asian solidarity conference held in February 1963 in Moshi (Tanzania) the Chinese for the first time clearly stated Peking's intention (in conversation between the Chinese delegation and Soviet representatives) of trying to



exclude the USSR from the Afro-Asian solidarity movement. At the conference, during discussion of problems relating to the struggle against colonialism, the threat of a thermonuclear war and unity or all progressive forces in the world, the Chinese delegates tried to fan nationalistic and racial prejudices, denounced the policy of peaceful coexistence as being harmful to the anti-imperialist struggle and attacked the USSR for striving to prevent a thermonuclear war.

Peking representatives again carried out splitting activities at the session of the executive council of the Organisation for Afro-Asian Solidarity held in Nicosia (Cyprus) in September 1963. They circulated Maoist literature among the delegates. To bolster their prestige they even brought with them several "African leaders" who had been living in Peking for some years but who were unrecognised in Africa. One of the "leaders" was ousted from the session.

At the fourth conference of Afro-Asian solidarity held in Winneba (Ghana) in May 1965 the Chinese delegation, as at previous conferences, directed its main fire not against imperialism and colonialism but against the foreign policies of the USSR and other socialist states. It tried to belittle the importance of Soviet support for the national liberation movement on the African continent.

In January 1966 the first solidarity conference of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America was held in Havana. The Maoists decided at this conference attended by 500 delegates from 82 countries and 100 observers from democratic organisations of various countries of the world to make more false accusations against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, to propagan-

dise Maoists' views and to create obstacles to establishing a unified anti-imperialist front.

In the end the session of the Council of the Organisation for Solidarity held in February 1967 in Nicosia was forced to cancel its previous resolution on holding the fifth Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Peking. The Peking leaders declared the resolutions of this session "illegal" and made a vain attempt to form a parallel solidarity organisation in Peking out of their "supporters"—who did not represent any country or people. The small number of Mao's admirers further shrank.

These failures, however, did not dampen the spirit of the Maoists who began stepping up their dissident activities in democratic organisations.

At the same time they continued to denounce participants in anti-imperialist meetings organised by progressive forces from the "outside". Thus, for example, Peking did not take part in the international conference, held in Khartoum in January 1969 in support of the peoples of the Portuguese colonies and South Africa, but sent to Khartoum a large group of "reporters" who, together with the Chinese embassy staff, distributed leaflets put out by a non-existent "solidarity committee" and did their utmost to undermine Africa's trust in the USSR and other socialist countries and discredit outstanding fighters for peace among nations.

These efforts, however, proved unsuccessful. Resolutions adopted at the Khartoum conference showed once again the growing political maturity and organisational skill of the African liberation movement.

The Maoists also did great harm to inter-state anti-imperialist solidarity on the Afro-Asian con-



continent which had developed so successfully after the Second World War and culminated in the 1955 Bandung Conference at which "ten principles" of peaceful coexistence were adopted. This conference played an important role in consolidating the unity of all progressive and newly independent countries and promoting the national liberation movement. This was the first conference of its kind in the history of Afro-Asian peoples. Delegates from 29 countries attended the meeting at which resolutions based on the principles of peaceful coexistence and struggle against colonialism in all its manifestations were adopted. The Chinese People's Republic took an active part in this conference, and all resolutions passed at the conference bear its signatures.

It must be noted that the imperialists exerted every effort to prevent the convening of the conference, and after the conference began its work they tried to sabotage it from within with the help of their puppets. However, their attempts failed owing to the fervent desire of the Afro-Asian people to unite their efforts in their struggle against neocolonialism.

Looking back over the events that have taken place since then, one cannot but come to the bitter conclusion that today the Peking splitters are trying to accomplish what imperialism had failed to achieve. The colonialists could hardly wish for more.

For many years now the Peking leaders have consistently violated every clause and every letter of the Bandung Conference resolutions. Peking's splitting activities (the attempts to form various axes, spreading rumours about plans to create a so-called revolutionary UN under Peking's ae-

gis, and other similar actions) have led some states to turn away from the "spirit of Bandung" and the position of positive neutrality.

Suffice it to recall the enormous damage done to Afro-Asian solidarity by Peking's efforts to influence the largest country of South-East Asia—Indonesia—in the first half of the sixties. By fanning big-power aspirations in Indonesia Peking succeeded in creating anti-Soviet sentiments there, in making Indonesia leave the UN, aggravate her relations with India and some other newly independent countries, and embark on the adventurist road.

The Maoists have ignored such an important Bandung principle as good-neighbourly relations and non-interference in the affairs of sovereign Asia states. Big-power chauvinism has become a cornerstone of their policy towards Afro-Asian states. Official Chinese propaganda began openly glorifying Jenghiz Khan, the Manchu Emperor Kang Hsi and other Chinese emperors who pursued an expansionist policy. School textbooks and other publications in China were revised along the same lines. Maps were published on which, as in the times of the Chiang Kai-shek rule, parts of Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Burma, Vietnam, India, the MPR, the USSR and other countries were shown as belonging to China.

Peking's chauvinistic policy was also revealed in their attitude towards the summit meetings of non-aligned countries. These meetings which are held periodically have become an important part of the anti-imperialist solidarity movement. The Chinese leaders, however, did their utmost to prevent the second conference of non-aligned states scheduled for October 1964 from taking place.



And after the conference opened in Cairo, Peking did everything possible to hamper the adoption of resolutions, sow suspicion and mistrust with respect to some states and cast doubt on the goals which the countries attending the conference had set out to achieve.

At the same period the Peking leaders were busy carrying out splitting activities on a large scale in connection with preparations for the "second Bandung" Afro-Asian conference to be held in Algiers in March 1965. It was owing to these "activities" that the conference was repeatedly postponed. The Maoists decided to start a general offensive this time and achieve its goal of "excommunicating" the Soviet Union from the anti-imperialist struggle of newly independent countries and establishing their hegemony in the national liberation movement.

At a preparatory meeting in Jakarta in April 1964, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chen Yi, opposed the suggestion of several states that the Soviet Union should participate in the conference. When Peking found little support of its position from countries taking part in the preparations, it stepped up its pressure. In summer 1965 Chou En-lai and Chen Yi undertook a tour of Afro-Asian countries hoping to tip the scale in their favour. But these efforts also failed. Peking then simply refused to take part in the conference, thus virtually acknowledging the failure of their attempts to achieve world supremacy. But the Chinese splitters did achieve some negative results which brought considerable satisfaction to the imperialists: the conference in Algiers was postponed indefinitely. This was a serious blow for the cause of consolidating Afro-

Asian inter-state solidarity.

Peking's adventurous policy with regard to Afro-Asian states not only weakens unity between various detachments of the national liberation movement but at the same time gives imperialists and internal reaction a good pretext for intensifying their activities, for launching anti-communist campaigns, and for demanding the creation of military pacts. It is well known that the new association, ASEAN, whose members are Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Singapore, was formed with the stated aim of combatting the "menace of Eastern imperialism", i.e. China.

But the imperialists are not satisfied with this association; they have not yet been able to make it carry out military functions and turn it into an effective weapon for their domination in Asia. Thus they use the bogey of Maoist extremism in trying to pressure some neutral Asian states into adopting pro-imperialist and not anti-imperialist positions. The USA and Britain together with Japan, Australia and New Zealand have lately expressed "concern" about the "security" of independent Asian countries. They talk about the need to counterbalance the "menace from the North" (i.e. from China) by organising a "regional system of security" which would include Japan and, hopefully, neutralist India. All these manoeuvres are poorly veiled attempts to form a large military bloc opposed to the interests of the national liberation movement of Asian peoples.

All that Peking's leftist talk has achieved is to provide opportunities for imperialism to broaden its attack on the national liberation movement.



## Evil Deeds All Around

It has long been noted that despite Peking's verbal attacks against world imperialism and especially the United States, Mao Tse-tung's policy of big-power chauvinism objectively merges with the aggressive policies of imperialism.

This, of course, is not a question of "collusion" of homogeneous socio-political forces. The dialectics of Peking's relations with imperialism are too complex to be comprehended by simplistic identification of their political lines. But in its essence, the Maoists' relationship to imperialism may well be characterised as *unprincipled pragmatic flirtation with imperialism for the sake of achieving world domination*.

In other words, the long-range objective of the Maoists is different from that of the imperialists, moreover, potentially it is directed against imperialist powers. However, numerous facts and the reaction of imperialist governments and statements as revealed in their press show that the present policies of Peking are much to the liking of world imperialism. Why is this so? Can the statesmen of leading imperialist states be so rash as to support and encourage a hostile force?

There is, however, no mystery in the matter. It is simply that the leaders of imperialism are taking a realistic approach to the words and deeds of the Maoists. They see that Peking's hegemonic aspirations are unlikely to be fulfilled in the near future, if at all, while they can be used today to promote the interests of imperialism since Peking, for the sake of realising its ambitions, is ready to betray (and is betraying now) the

cause of international anti-imperialist unity, to sacrifice the interests of the countries of the socialist community and the national liberation movement.

Thus the immediate goals of the imperialists and the Maoists coincide, which are: to pursue an anti-Soviet policy, to weaken the socialist community and isolate the national liberation movement. And in solving these "common" problems each hopes that it would win in the end.

Peking has long been searching for "reliable partners" in its anti-Soviet activities. Mao realised that such partners would more likely be found among circles with revanchist views and territorial ambitions. Sometimes he tried to whip up such an atmosphere. For example, in July 1964 during talks with a group of visiting Japanese specialists Mao declared that he intended some time in the future to present the Soviet Union with claims to territories in the Far East which rightfully belonged to the Soviet Union. Mao further spoke of the "necessity" of handing over the Kuril Islands to Japan. Thus Mao made it clear to the militarist and revanchist circles in Japan that they had better support Maoist China and not undertake steps to achieve good-neighbourly relations with the USSR. To please Japan the Maoists have expressed readiness to sign a separate peace treaty with Japan and began actively to revive the racist pan-Asian conception.

To revive the chauvinistic pan-Asian conception is clearly to betray the interests of the national liberation movement. Whereas before it was the Japanese imperialists who advocated the pan-Asian idea and presented themselves as the leading Asian force, today the Maoists revive the



idea in the hope this will lead to the establishment of extensive Sino-Japanese ties.

In one of several confidential talks with a group of visiting Japanese economists (the contents of the talks were later disclosed by participants in the meeting), China's premier Chou En-lai made it clear that the way for Japanese monopoly circles to expand their influence in the newly independent countries lies not in cooperation with the United States or the countries of the European "Common Market" but in cooperation with Afro-Asian countries through partnership with China. China's readiness to bring about such "cooperation" between Japan and the newly independent countries was confirmed once again in the middle of 1965 by Chen Yi in his conversation with Tokuma Utsunomia, a prominent figure of the ruling liberal democratic party in Japan. Utsunomia reported later that on their visits to Africa Peking officials would repeatedly say to the African governments: "If you need technical aid, it is best to apply to Japan, for it is an Asian country."

Again, all this does not mean that Peking really wants to see the Japanese monopoly circles prosper. By suggesting that Japan "cooperate" with developing countries Peking is interested first of all in the possibility of attaining its own supremacy in the Afro-Asian world. This does not, of course, make the situation any easier for the peoples of the newly independent countries, and treachery remains treachery.

Peking seeks anti-Soviet partners not only in Asia but also in Europe. Here, too, the Peking leaders are ready to sacrifice other countries' territorial interests for the sake of their own hege-

monic designs. For example, in June 1964 the West German magazine *Der Spiegel* reported a statement by Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi which mentioned "the two parts of Germany" and referred to the GDR as "East Germany". According to the pro-fascist *Deutsche National Zeitung und Soldaten Zeitung*, the CPR's ambassador to Paris "bluntly declared that the CPR is ready to recognise the Federal Republic as the only German state, sever diplomatic relations with the GDR and recognise the Hallstein Doctrine as the price for obtaining an official agreement with the FRG for considerably expanding Sino-German trade relations".

We do not know how accurately this statement reflects the views of Peking. But it is a well known fact that when a Chinese diplomat deviates even slightly from Peking's line he is immediately recalled. In the present case this did not happen. At any rate, Peking-Bonn relations have since then become closer and closer and their unannounced political contacts have become more frequent.

What is the basis for the Peking-Bonn rapprochement? For the FRG is not an Asian country and is situated far from the borders of China.

Bonn and Peking are faced with the same obstacle on their way to the coveted goal (in one case—revanchist, in the other—hegemonic), and that is the Soviet Union. That is why they have made anti-Sovietism the cornerstone of their foreign policies. The Belgium newspaper *La Wallonie* noted on March 5, 1969: "The outline of a strategy based on Germany's desire for power, a desire not at all destroyed with the defeat in 1945, gradually becomes more visible in the fog.



Common hatred for the Soviet Union could well lead to the consolidation of Sino-West German efforts against the USSR."

"Any methods are acceptable, any ally is good enough,"—these words may well describe the activities of Bonn and Peking. In his latest book, *The Challenge and the Reply*, FRG's Finance Minister Strauss pointed out the "temporary and partial" coincidence of Bonn's and Peking's interests and noted that Peking's position provided "weighty" arguments against recognising the status quo in Europe.

In an article published in *Bayern-Kurier*, his party organ, Strauss wrote: "German policy has so far failed to take into account the fact that our present most powerful enemy, the Soviet Union, will one day have not only ideological but also territorial conflicts with its southern enemy which has a far larger population." Strauss also said in the article that on some questions Bonn's views were closer to those of Peking than to those of their NATO partners. That is lucidly put, indeed!

Whether the Maoists wish it or not, they are in the same team as the vilest and most aggressive forces on earth.

Rapprochement between the Maoists and the West German revenge-seekers does not merely consist in exchange of civilities in the political sphere, it rests on serious material considerations.

As Peking's policies became increasingly anti-Soviet and anti-socialist, not only political ties but also trade and economic cooperation between China and the countries of the socialist community weakened. For example, during 1961-67, on Peking's initiative, commodity turnover of the

CPR with socialist countries was reduced almost threefold, and its share in China's foreign trade dropped from 64 to 23 per cent. At the same time the CPR's trade with developed capitalist countries increased threefold. West Germany was China's second largest trade partner after Japan.

It should be noted that commodity turnover between the FRG and China grew particularly rapidly. Whereas in 1963 it amounted to less than 200 million marks, in 1968 it reached 1,200 million marks. In 1968 alone, five different trade missions from China visited West Germany and placed large orders with West German firms. Peking even substituted the West German mark for the French franc in its trade dealings with other countries.

West Germany in its turn shows great interest in economic cooperation with China. New organisations mushroomed overnight in the FRG for dealing with Sino-West German ties. The US newspaper, *New York Daily Column*, noted in this connection that it might be said that there was not a single large firm in the FRG which was not supplying some strategic equipment to Peking.

What is the meaning of this re-orientation of the CPR's foreign trade?

It is of course China's own business as to with whom China should trade and on what scale. The expansion of its commodity turnover with developed capitalist countries would have caused no concern among friends of the Chinese people if it were not for the following important circumstance: the strange nature of the trade and economic relations of China with the FRG.



The trouble is that these relations do not at all resemble the usual mutually beneficial economic ties between two states. They might well be described as Peking-Bonn military and political cooperation which is directed against the interests of socialist states and threatens the interests of the working people in China. It is this circumstance that causes alarm on the part of the peoples of the socialist community as well as all honest and progressive people in the world.

Indeed, what China receives from West Germany consists mainly of military strategic materials necessary for creating a nuclear potential in China: metallurgical and steel rolling enterprises for creating a basis for home rocket construction, special types of steel and parts for direct assembly of ballistic rockets, heavy water which is used in China for nuclear reactors. Together with military and strategic materials Bonn sends its experts on rocket and airplane designing.

The Belgian newspaper *La Wallonie* commented on the Sino-West German cooperation as follows: "It is well known fact that the West Germans are carrying on extensive trade with China. It is less known, however, that many scientists, engineers and nazi cadres are in China today."

Through various figureheads and third countries Bonn has delivered a considerable amount of weapons and military machinery to China. The very same Krupp company which had actively helped to equip Hitler's troops now ships large consignments of fire arms to the Chinese adventurers. According to the US newspaper *Washington Evening Star*, West German shipyards are supplying torpedo boats to China. West Germany

also sells China scores of US planes of various makes, military vehicles and other machinery.

That Peking is eager to carry on this one-sided cooperation with Bonn is shown by the fact that it is not at all alarmed by the constant trade deficit with respect to the FRG. In 1967 alone imports from the FRG exceeded Chinese export to this country by more than twofold. Bonn in its turn, for the sake of trading with China, tries in every way to circumvent the NATO embargo on export of military and strategic materials to socialist countries. These systematic violations of the embargo are looked upon with indulgence in the US.

Is it not strange that the ruling circles of the FRG which had observed the embargo on steel pipes intended for peace purposes in the Soviet Union are so willing to deliver military and strategic weapons and equipment to the Maoists? Does this position not show that the imperialists no longer regard China as a part of the defence system of the socialist countries but, on the contrary, consider it partner in the struggle against this system?

Such is the logical outcome of the Maoists' deviation from the ideals of scientific socialism.

Peking's foreign policies with respect to US imperialism deserve special attention. As is known, Peking leaders have repeatedly stated that the USA is the "chief" enemy of the newly independent peoples and of China itself and have often protested against the policies of the US ruling circles.

But according to former US Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the Peking leaders "were much more cautious and reserved in their actions than in



their phraseology." *The New York Times* on September 18, 1964 expressed the same view even more explicitly. It wrote that words which previously testified of certain conceptions or future developments now lost their influence to a greater extent insofar as they are repeated endlessly and are not followed up by deeds.

Sad as it may be, one must acknowledge that the imperialist newspaper has analysed the matter correctly: Peking's numerous anti-imperialist statements are not backed up by anti-imperialist activities. These statements are probably meant to conceal from the world Peking's secret search for a way of reaching an agreement with the US. And not a single reasonable man would object to China and the USA settling their conflicts. The only question is: how and at whose expense is this to be done? At the expense of the USSR, Vietnam or the national liberation movement? But then it is no longer a private matter between the USA and China. Could this be the reason why Peking has been so carefully concealing and camouflaging everything regarding its lengthy negotiations with the US? Since Peking opposes the policy of peaceful coexistence, which has the support of all progressive forces in the world, and has carried out military provocations on the Sino-Soviet border, what could be the meaning of its offer made in November 1968 to conclude an agreement with the USA based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence? Against whom could such an agreement between China and the USA be directed?

There is an old saying: "What is done by night appears by day." One cannot help recalling it as one observes Peking's futile attempts to con-

ceal from the progressive world public its eagerness to reach agreement with the USA. For example, in the recently published account of meetings between a Canadian and a US parliamentary group, Alvin Hamilton, former Minister for Agriculture in Canada, said that when he returned from his tour of Peking in 1964 he brought back with him a message from Chou En-lai for the United States. With Chou En-lai's preliminary approval this message was read in early 1965 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

What did the message say?

It says that Peking is ready to improve relations with the USA on condition that the latter recognises all its territorial claims, that is on condition that the USA agrees to China's domination over territories that formed the Chinese Empire in 1900.

Such an approach reveals Peking's desire to achieve its goals by making a deal with the USA and sacrificing the interests of other nations including the USSR and the Mongolian People's Republic. During his talks with Hamilton Chou En-lai indicated that Peking would not raise the issue of China's rightful claims to the territory of Taiwan at least for the next several years.

A logical sequel to this backstage flirtation of Peking's leaders with the US ruling circles was their suggestion made in November 1968 to hold talks with the US. It is significant that the question of the return of Taiwan to China, usually mentioned in Peking's official statements, was not touched on this time. Peking merely demanded the withdrawal of US troops from Taiwan ignoring the point that the essence of the problem consists not in the stationing of comparably small



contingents of US troops on Taiwan but in the presence of the US Seventh Fleet between China's mainland and Taiwan, and in all-round US support of the reactionary Chiang Kai-shek regime.

In order to divert attention from their backstage manoeuvres the Maoists raise a clamour about "collusion" between the USSR and US. For example, when US President Nixon announced the creation of a US anti-missile defence system, the Hsinhua News Agency immediately declared that this "is new proof that American imperialism and Soviet revisionism have entered into a military pact against China." Thus, a US decision directed *against* the USSR is interpreted as "collusion" between the USSR and the USA.

Yes, today we are forced to conclude that Peking, despite its anti-US talk which nobody takes seriously any longer, has given up the anti-imperialist struggle. Instead, it is actively seeking contacts and rapprochement with the US and close economic, military and political cooperation with West Germany.

Moreover, Peking shares common interests with West German militarists with respect to racist and colonial regimes in Africa. For example, the Berlin newspaper *Junge Welt* reported last March that Chinese specialists were studying missile systems at West German plants in the South African Republic and observing experimental launchings of German rockets from testing grounds in Portuguese Angola. How, indeed, can Peking be expected to take an interest in anti-imperialist struggle?!

Such a treacherous position is nothing new. For example, according to the Senegal newspaper *Afrique Nouvelle*, Peking promised to sever its

economic ties with the South African Republic as far back as in the middle of 1960. However Peking continued to expand its trade with this stronghold of racism in Africa in the sixties. According to official data published by the South African government, trade between the South African Republic and China in 1961-63 increased tenfold. Wishing to conceal from the African public its shameful cooperation with a racist regime, Peking asked the South African Republic during talks in 1965 in Hongkong not to release information about their contacts, and the South African government willingly consented. As for the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique, China maintains trade relations with them through Macao. These facts further explain why the Maoists adopt a conciliatory approach towards colonialist countries which continue to rule over territories rightfully belonging to China. Thus Peking's ardent declarations of "love" and "support" for the African liberation movement are pure hypocrisy.

All these facts clearly show that the principal feature of Peking's foreign policy is not internationalism but mercenary pragmatism. But there is nothing surprising about this. After all, it was none other than Mao Tse-tung who declared, in one of his speeches in Yanan in 1942, that "Marxism is good because it is profitable."

It is this idea of "profit" that underlies the Maoist approach to the liberating struggle of Afro-Asian peoples. The Maoists noisily denounce the "paper tiger" (i.e. US imperialism) while at the same time carrying on "quiet" negotiations with the US, which have lasted for almost fifteen years, regarding with calm the anchoring of the US



Seventh Fleet in Hongkong where it is supplied with drinking water and food delivered from the territory of the CPR. They jeer at the Soviet Union's economic cooperation with and aid to developing countries denouncing them as "economism", while at the same time conducting back-stage negotiations with reactionary West German circles and concluding secret trade and economic deals with them involving hundreds of millions of dollars. Finally, they organise mass rallies of "solidarity" with the struggle of the peoples in Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia and the South African Republic while at the same time carrying on secret and profitable trade with the South African racists through Hongkong and with the Portuguese colonialists in Angola and Mozambique through Macao.

■ The attempts of the Mao Tse-tung group over many years to gain control over the national liberation movement and the world revolutionary process have failed. In trying to split up the revolutionary movement of the newly independent nations and prevent these nations from having contacts with the world socialist system, Peking is finding itself almost completely isolated. And this is not surprising. The peoples, progressive forces and communist parties of the newly independent countries are able to see for themselves that Peking's adventurist policy is a total failure. Numerous statements by public figures in Afro-Asian countries confirm this. For example, commenting on Peking's attempts to export the so-called cultural revolution, the Senegal newspaper *Afrique Nouvelle* said: "China's goal is obvious:

to find supporters in Africa capable of anything and, first and foremost, of subversive activities." "China's supporters," it continued, "impede active struggle against racism and colonialism. It is vitally important for China to find strategic strongholds in Africa. Striving for this goal China believes that it will be able to afford the luxury of splitting the communist and national movements."

The Nigerian newspaper *Morning Post* also pointed out that "the ambitious designs of Mao consist in establishing his domination over the developing world; they do not ensure the triumph of freedom and prosperity in this world."

The total failure of Peking's policies does not, of course, mean that the difficulties and dangers arising from the Maoists' splitting activities are overcome. It is necessary to point out that imperialism continues to utilise Mao's policies to strengthen its own position.

But, despite Peking's manoeuvres and some subjective difficulties in uniting left-wing forces in newly independent countries, there is historical need for their unity. Today there is sound basis for unity of progressive, anti-imperialist forces in the newly independent countries and in lands that are fighting for their liberty as well as on an international scale. A true guarantee of success in the struggle against imperialism and against the subversive activities of the Maoist splitters lies in the growing cooperation between the national liberation movement and world socialism.